"THE net effect of the Race Relations Act 1976 has been to make race the most-powerful and all-pervasive gauge through which to perceive society. Everything in society has been given a race smear by the Act. The implication of this on the Muslim community - ironically the most multi-racial and biggest within the ethnic community - has been disastrous.
In retrospect, we can say that the Act has been the one major cause for the deprivation, alienation and marginalisation of Britain's Muslim community. Unless it is drastically altered, there is no way the prevailing sense of injustice, discrimination and hostility among the Muslims towards the indigenous society can be effectively and sensibly disfused.
Service delivery based on race invariably ignores Muslim needs. Recent events, particularly the Rushdie affair, have provided strong evidence that religious affiliation is far more central than colour and ethnic origins in determining the legitimate needs and aspirations of Muslim citizens.
Providing for the ethnic minorities, using racial categories, does not only bypass the Muslim community but also positively discriminates against them." "Response from An-Nisa Society et al" in "Need for Reform", The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, 1993, p.41.
S.26(1) of the Act reads in part: "An association to which section 25 applies is within this subsection if the main objects of the association is to enable the benefits of membership (whatever they may be) to be enjoyed by persons of a particular racial group defined otherwise than by reference to colour; ..."
S.26 exemption thus makes it possible for a club or association to lawfully discriminate on "racial" grounds, but not on the grounds of "colour". For example, the London Welsh Tiddlywinks club (not a real name) remains a lawful association under the provisions of the "1976 Act" provided that it does not exclude "black" Welshmen. As things are, however, it might exclude Welsh gipsies or Welsh Jews on "racial" grounds with legal impunity.
Defining the Sikhs as an ethnic group has had certain disadvantages, as shown by the following observations.
"A lesson in the power of the law to shape our thinking followed. The first major question at the beginning of the 1980s for the courts in this context (the protection of persons from the Indian sub-continent - my comment) was whether Sikhs could be protected under the three Race Relations Acts. Lord Denning led a unanimous Court of Appeal in saying that Sikhs were a religious, not a racial, group; that the Race Relations Act did not protect groups defined by religion; so there was a gap in the law, and Sikhs were not protected.
The House of Lords unanimously overturned that decision and stretched the definition of race to cover Sikhs. ...
Later in the 1980s, Muslims tried to invoke the Sikh decision in industrial tribunals to claim protection from discrimination in the workplace, but were thwarted. The prospect of protecting Muslims was an extension too far for many liberal commentators." Lee, S., "Putting faith in the law", "Church Times", 20 06 1997, p.6.
"Too late, the pundits began to realise that, from their own perspective, there had been a respectable argument (the one they normally applied against power-mad judges) in favour of cautious decisions by judges in the Sikh case. If Lord Denning's decision had held, the (Thatcher) Government might well have been forced to address the issue properly through legislation which encompassed religion as well as race". Ibid., p6.
"Banton claims that British law has developed an adequate (and by implication superior) vocabulary to deal with discrimination. Yet, by his own admission, this is drawn not from a more sophisticated or theorised comprehension of the reality of social relations but rather from everyday meanings: both the British House of Lords and the Court of Appeal agree that the notions of 'colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins' are to be interpreted in the light of public definitions (Banton, M., 'The race relations problematic', British Journal of Sociology, 1991, 42(1): 125). In other words, the legal category of 'race' is formally defined and given legal sanction in accordance with the everyday definition of 'race'. ...
The problem originates in the law itself, and not in the practice of the courts per se. ... Banton notes that the three Race Relations Acts suggest that 'each individual should be assigned to a race, and that relations between persons of different race were necessarily different from relations between persons of the same race' (Banton, Ibid., 115). The definition is necessarily circular: a 'race' is a group of people defined by 'their race': this formulation assumes and legitimates as a reality that each human being 'belongs' to a 'race'." Miles, R., "Racism after 'race relations', Routledge, 1993.
In case anyone should get the wrong impression from the above quotation, one of the people to whom Professor Miles dedicates his book is Professor Banton, who has worked valiantly over the years for the cause of good "race relations".
Thus "race" in British law is defined as it would be by a racist in the street. As far as it goes, this is admirably sensible as only by speaking the language of racism can one hope to address its consequences. The danger however is that without proper controls the law becomes a legitimising authority for the very same social "race" mythology that lies at the root of racist behaviour. As far as the law is concerned it need not matter whether "race" represents biological reality or not. That the discriminator is deluded in his or her racist beliefs need not concern a law that is aimed only at proscribing his or her acts of racial discrimination in defined circumstances. British law tries to strike an appropriate balance between freedom of thought and the freedom to act. The danger however is that the law will become the agent, via s.26 exemptions, by which associations grounded in a "street definition" of "race" (i.e. a racist definition) gain legitimisation in society. This could never have been the original intention of the draftees.
Although it is true that "race", ethnicity or religion, or some combination thereof, might give grounds for discrimination, it is difficult to see how these can be harmonised in actual Jewish existence. For its part, the "1976 Act", not unreasonably, appears interested only to identify and proscribe certain grounds for discrimination as unlawful. It does not pretend to be a description of things as they really exist. For example, if in reality the Jews actually constitute a "race" then the concepts "ethnicity" (especially when, as is often now the case, its use is restricted to cultural group characteristics) and "religion" are essentially redundant. An association constituted in "Jewish race" not only negates the legitimacy of those constituted in "Jewish culture" or "Judaism" (i.e. religion), but also, if recognised in law, effectively institutionalises "Jewish race" in British society.
Incidentally, not even the concept "Jew" in Nazi "race" legislation was actually based on "Jewish race" (1). This is intended as interesting background concerning a topic that is little understood and is not meant as a comment on the concept "Jew" in British legislation.
The "International Messianic Jewish Alliance" (2) is a Christian association of so called "Messianic Jews" and a Christian mission to the Jews. In the early 1990s the "Commission for Racial Equality" (CRE) investigated the IMJA and was persuaded that it enjoys s.26 exemption. If you are not already familiar with the IMJA you can review it using the link provided at the start of this paragraph.
Assuming that "essential" means just that, I shall set aside the "non-essential characteristics" detailed in "Mandla" and examine the IMJA in the light of the two essential characteristics mentioned above.
Some people get understandably confused by the language employed by missions like the IMJA. So here is a short glossary:
Incidentally, in case a Muslim reading this might think him or herself safe from such misleading practises, the Southern Baptists in the US are trying a similar approach to Islam according to a report at: http://www.balaams-ass.com/journal/warnings/jesumosq.htm. You should be warned that much of the information held on this "Christian" site is very offensive to Muslims.
There is still doubt as to whether the IMJA is entitled to s.26 exemption from s.25 of the "1976 Act". This is because to date no one has tested this point in a British court. Until this happens or there is a change in the law, the IMJA is apparently free to practice racial discrimination against its fellow so called "non-Jewish Christian" associate members, esentially, in the name of the Jewish community. A similar situation exists with respect to the "Messianic Jewish Association of Great Britain" (3) another British based mission to the Jews. That neither is typically "Jewish" should be obvious from reading "Two separate concepts of "Jew" - one racist, one not" (4).
Further confusion was added recently when PC Paul Thomas (a convert to Judaism) was allowed to take action under the "1976 Act" as a Jew against the antisemitism he suffered at work (he went on to win his case). Initially, his employer's defence tried to argue that he was not entitled to take action under the Act, essentially, because he is not a Jew by "race". However, this defence was unlikely to succeed since according to "Mandla" a person can fall into a particular "racial group" either by birth or adherence and accordingly this defence was withdrawn. Consequently, we now have a situation where the law appears to accept that "Jew" is not in reality a term of racial classification, yet associations like the IMJA and the MJAGB can apparently lawfully discriminate against their own associate members on racial grounds as though it is.
I agree with the "UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs" quoted at the beginning of this article that there is need for reform of the "Race Relations Act 1976". More attention should be given to combatting religious discrimination. Reform of s.26 exemption is also needed to ensure that the law does not become the means by which social "race" mythology is fossilised in British society.